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This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is re-
distributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes,
which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences sat-
isfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may
not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in
particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the
middle class.
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11 Introduction
Progressive income taxes are generally seen as a device to redistribute income
from the rich to the poor. This idea is at the heart of the optimal taxation
literature (Mirrlees, 1971) as well as most contributions in the political eco-
nomics tradition (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
However, the incidence of the tax depends not on the progressivity of the
tax schedule, but on the progressivity of tax payments. These, however, are
inﬂuenced by individual decisions, such as how much to work and save, and
the decision of how much taxes to pay. In this paper, we ask the follow-
ing question: How does tax evasion inﬂuence the outcome of a game where
individuals vote on an indirectly progressive income tax?
The paper builds on and combines two distinct strands of literature. On
the one hand, Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981)
have analyzed voting on indirectly progressive tax schedules. In this type of
model (the “RRMR” model), if voters can be ordered by their income level,
the voting outcome corresponds to the preferred tax rate of the median in-
come earner. For instance, if labor income is monontonically increasing in
the wage rate, the equilibrium corresponds to the optimum of the median
wage earner. In all of these models, taxes are paid for sure. On the other
hand, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1973), and others have an-
alyzed the individual tax evasion decision. In their models, however, taxes
are treated as exogenous.1
A few papers have studied the interrelation of tax evasion and public
spending. The interplay between public goods supply and tax evasion is
studied by Cowell and Gordon (1988) and Falkinger (1991). Cowell and Gor-
don (1988) look at the eﬀect of public goods on tax evasion, while Falkinger
(1991) analyzes how evasion aﬀects the optimal supply of public goods. Slem-
rod (1994) analyzes the impact of avoidance on tax progression in an optimal
taxation framework. He ﬁnds that increased possibility of avoidance for the
rich makes the income tax less eﬀective in redistribution and thus reduces
the optimal linear tax rate. Roine (1999)analyzes voting on redistribution
with tax avoidance, which is legal. Hence, enforcement plays no role in his
model. Two experimental studies on tax evasion and voting are presented by
Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan (1995) and Feld and Tyran (2002). Their focus,
1See Cowell (1990), Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2000) for surveys of the tax evasion literature.
2however, is on the inﬂuence of voting on social norms of tax compliance.
Tax evasion has an impact on the voting game which is not trivial. The
RRMR model assumes that pre-tax income is monotonic in the wage rate.
This implies that voters can be ordered such that richer individuals prefer
lower tax rates than poorer voters. The equilibrium corresponds to the pre-
ferred tax rate of the median wage earner. In the present model, the ordering
of preferences depends on taxed income which depends on the evasion deci-
sion. Richer voters may have lower taxed income than poorer ones if they
evade at lower tax rates. Hence, the ordering of preferences may be reversed.
This implies that an equilibrium may not exist. However, when it does, it
may not be of the simple “rich prefer lower taxes than poor” type. In par-
ticular, it may be that the rich and poor prefer higher taxes, at the margin,
while the middle class voters prefer lower taxes.
In models of public provision of private goods, there are also interesting
properties of voting equilibria. In particular, Epple and Romano (1996b)
Epple and Romano (1996a) show that equilibria may have the property that
the rich and poor vote against the middle class, whereas Fernandez and
Rogerson (1995) argue that voting may lead to public provision of education
which beneﬁts the rich and middle class at the expense of the poor.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines a simple model
where voters are risk neutral. Section 3 describes the voting game. In section
4 we describe the possible outcomes of the game. Section 5 discusses the case
of risk aversion. With the use of an example, it is shown that there may be
equilibria where the tax redistributes from poor to rich. The last section
contains short conclusions. Some of the detail of the analysis is relegated to
the Appendix.
2 The Model
We use a very simple model in order to illustrate the basic idea. The economy
consists of three risk neutral individuals, who diﬀer with respect to their pre-
tax income level, given by y1 > y2 > y3. The assumption of risk neutrality is
not completely innocuous, an issue to which we return in Section 5.
There is a linear income tax with tax rate t 2 [0;1]. However, a taxpayer
may wish to hide her income. In the case of evasion, there is a ﬁxed proba-
bility p 2 [0;1] that an individual will be audited and her true income will
be known. Let e be the amount evaded. In case of an audit, the individual
3pays tax on the true income, ty, plus a penalty of the form ste+F, where s
is the penalty rate and F a ﬁxed ﬁne.
The ﬁxed cost should literally be interpreted as a ﬁxed ﬁne component.
With a slight reinterpretation, however, one might also think of ore generally,
the monetary equivalent of the costs of going to court, being put in jail, ﬁxed
“moral costs” of evasion, diﬀering cheating opportunities due to employment
situation, etc. Note that if speaking of non-monetary costs, F should be
interpreted as the monetary equivalent of the opportunity cost. In this case,
however, the model would have to be slightly changed in that the government
budget constraint should include the “real” ﬁscal transfer from the taxpayer,
which may be nil as in the case of moral costs.
Tax proceeds are used to ﬁnance a per capita grant of g. Individuals are
assumed to vote on the tax rate and transfer before evasion decisions are
made.
An individual’s expected net of tax income is therefore
y
n
i = (1 ¡ t)yi + g
if she does not evade, and
y
e
i = (1 ¡ t)yi ¡ p((1 + s)tei + F) + (1 ¡ p)tei + g







The assumption of risk neutrality implies that individuals evade either all
or none of their income. In particular, an individual is indiﬀerent between





i , t =
pF
(1 ¡ (1 + s)p)yi
´ ti: (1)
Individuals will not evade any income when t · ti and their entire income
when t > ti. As long as p;F > 0, there is a tax rate where all taxpayers
honestly report their income. Equation (1) implies @ti=@yi < 0 so that
t1 < t2 < t3.
The expected tax payment of an individual is
Ti = minftyi;p((1 + s)tyi + F)g:
4The assumptions made so far imply that individuals are only able to pay
the ﬁnes imposed on them on average, but the actual ﬁnes may exceed the
individual income. This is of course due to the assumption of risk neutrality.
Literally, people would evade even if they were hung when caught cheating,
if only the evasion gamble is fair. One might assume a small degree of risk
aversion to make sure individuals would not evade when their entire income
is taxed away in case of detection. This would imply that in equilibrium each
individual will be able to pay her actual tax burden inclusive of the penalty.
Another way to deal with this problem would be to impose an additional
constraint on the level of ﬁnes (or impose individuals to evade only that
fraction of income which leaves them enough to pay the ﬁne). An alternative
would be either to assume some tax exempt income high enough to pay the
ﬁne.
Voting takes place before evasion so expenditures must equal expected







Since all three individuals always evade either all or none of their income,
the budget locus is piecewise linear, with kinks at the tax rates ti where one
individual starts evading. Since individual i is indiﬀerent between evading
or not at ti, Ti is the same whether he evades or not, but the slope dTi=dt is
ﬂatter when the individual evades, which implies a kink but no discontinuous
jump at ti.
3 Voting
Individuals vote for the tax rate which maximises their net income. We
assume that voting is pairwise by simple majority.
Since expected net income is linear in t, attention can be restricted to a
choice between ﬁve tax rates: 0;t1;t2;t3 and 1. The following result estab-
lishes some properties of individual utility as a function of the tax rate.
Proposition 1 (i) Voter 1’s utility is linearly decreasing on [0;t1] with marginal
utility ¯ y¡y1, linear on [t1;t2] with marginal utility ¡2
3p(1+s)y1+ 1
3(y2+y3),
linear on [t2;t3] with marginal utility ¡2
3p(1+s)y1+ 1
3(p(1+s)y2+y3), linearly
decreasing on [t3;1] with marginal utility p(1 + s)(¯ y ¡ y1).
5(ii) Voter 2’s utility is linear on [0;t1] with marginal utility ¯ y ¡y2, linear
on [t1;t2] with marginal utility ¡2
3y2 + 1
3(p(1 + s)y1 + y3), linear on [t2;t3]
with marginal utility ¡2
3p(1 + s)y2 + 1
3(p(1 + s)y1 + y3), linear on [t3;1] with
marginal utility p(1 + s)(¯ y ¡ y2).
(iii) Voter 3’s utility is linearly increasing on [0;t1] with marginal utility
¯ y¡y3, linear on [t1;t2] with marginal utility ¡2
3y3+ 1
3(p(1+s)y1+y2), linear
on [t2;t3] with marginal utility ¡2
3y3 + 1
3p(1+s)(y1 +y2), linearly increasing
on [t3;1] with marginal utility p(1 + s)(¯ y ¡ y3) > 0.










Using the deﬁnition of Ti and examining Ti as function of the tis gives the
result. ¥
Consider voter 2 to illustrate the redistributive nature of the tax system.
For 0 · t · t1, utility is increasing if and only if y2 < ¯ y. This is as in
the standard model without evasion. For t1 · t · t2, only voter 1 evades.
Here, voter 2 does not necessarily beneﬁt from higher taxes since these are
paid by the rich only if expected ﬁnes are high enough. In fact, if y2 >
1
2 (p(1 + s)y1 + y3), the tax eﬀectively redistributes from the middle class to
the rich and poor. At t2, voter 2 starts evading so marginal utility is higher








is likely to be satisﬁed if y2 is small relative to y3, and also if enforcement is
suﬃciently lax that redistribution is eﬀectively from the poor to the middle
class and rich. Finally, for t ¸ t3, all voters evade and voter 2 beneﬁts from
higher taxes if and only if y2 < ¯ y.
Note that utility may not be single peaked and, hence, a voting equilib-
rium may fail to exist (see below). Figure 1 shows possible preferences for
individual 2, where voter 2 prefers lower taxes for t1 < t < t2 and higher
taxes for t > t2.
4 Outcomes
Since preferences are linear in tax rates, there are ﬁve alternative possible
outcomes, namely, t = 0;t = t1;t = t2;t = t3, and t = 1. Hence, each









Figure 1: Voter 2’s preferences over tax policy
individual has potentially 120 diﬀerent preference proﬁles. This makes for
1203 = 1;728;000 possible outcomes. However, some of these individual
preferences never occur: Individual 1 never prefers t1 to 0, and conversely,
individual 3 never prefers 0 to t1. We will further restrict the possibilities
by assuming that y2 < ¯ y, so that in line with many real world distributions,
median income is below average. Further, suppose that individual 3’s in-
come is such that she never evades at any tax rate less than one for given
enforcement parameters.2 This is also in line with the observation that some
individuals never evade.3 Appendix A lists all possible individual preference
proﬁles. From these, it is also possible to deduce certain relationships among
these individual preferences (see Appendix B).
We now turn to a description of possible outcomes. First, it may be that
no equilibrium exists. Second, an equilibrium may exist with “conventional”
properties, namely, redistribution from rich to poor. Third, there may be
equilibria which do not have conventional properties. These three possibilities
are described with the help of examples in the next three subsections. The
Appendix lists all possible outcomes.
2This implies y3 · pF=(1¡(1+s)p). For the computations, we assume this holds with
equality.
3This is sometimes oﬀered as a critique of the standard model of tax evasion, since one
observes that individuals do not evade even when the odds are very good (for instance,
typical numbers for the audit rate of 0.015 and penalty rate of 0.2 imply that at observed
tax rates everyone should evade if there were no ﬁxed ﬁne). In terms of our model, we
may interpret F as a ﬁxed moral cost. Thus, for some individuals the moral costs may be
so high that they do not evade even when the probability of getting caught is low.
74.1 No Equilibrium
Since individual preferences are not single peaked, the possibility of “voting
cycles” arises. For instance, consider the parameters given by s = 0:2;F =
2;y1 = 3:1;y2 = 2;y3 = 1. This corresponds to Case 1 in Appendix B. Let
x Âi y denote “individual i strictly prefers x to y”, and let x Â y denote “x
is preferred to y by the majority of voters”. The individual preferences are:
Individual 1 : 0 Â1 t2 Â1 t1 Â1 1 (3)
Individual 2 : 1 Â2 t1 Â2 0 Â2 t2 (4)
Individual 3 : t2 Â2 1 Â2 t1 Â2 0: (5)
A voting cycle occurs:
t2 Â 1 Â t1 Â 0 Â t2:
4.2 “Conventional” Equilibria
There are also cases where an equilibrium exists which is “conventional” since
it has the properties of the RRMR model. For instance, let s = 0:1;F =
0:25;y1 = 4;y2 = 2;y3 = 1. This corresponds to Case 14 listed in Appendix
B. Individual preferences are as follows:
Individual 1 : 0 Â1 t1 Â1 t2 Â1 1 (6)
Individual 2 : 1 Â2 t2 Â2 t1 Â2 0 (7)
Individual 3 : 1 Â3 t2 Â3 t1 Â3 0: (8)
Obviously, individuals 2 and 3 have the same preferences and their pre-
ferred tax rate of 1 is the Condorcet winner. This conforms to the equilibrium
without evasion. However, here, all three individuals evade.4 But redistri-
bution is still from rich to poor, since the expected ﬁnes are proportional to
income and these are redistributed lump sum.
If y1 is very large, then any gains individual 1 may have by evading are
swamped by the redistributive eﬀect. Likewise, if voters 1 and 2 are poor
enough, they always prefer more redistribution to less.
4Individual 3 has been assumed to be indiﬀerent between evading or not.
84.3 “Unconventional” Equilibria
Some equilibria have interesting properties. Consider the parameters: s =
0:3;F = 3;y1 = 3:1;y2 = 2:4;y3 = 2. This corresponds to Case 11 listed in
Appendix B. Preferences over the tax rates are as follows:
Individual 1 : 0 Â1 1 Â1 t2 Â1 t1 (9)
Individual 2 : t1 Â2 1 Â2 t2 Â2 0 (10)
Individual 3 : t1 Â3 t2 Â3 1 Â3 0: (11)
Since both individual 1 and 2 have t1 = 0:65 as their preferred tax rate,
this is the Condorcet winner.5 This equilibrium is “conventional” in the sense
that the distributional conﬂict is between the rich on the one side and the
poor and middle class on the other. However, the rich are not extremely rich,
so they would beneﬁt from taxation in the range where they start to evade.
The poor and middle class would lose. Hence, in this equilibrium, no one
evades, and the possibility of evasion limits redistribution.
Now, suppose that s = 0:4;F = 3;y1 = 3:1;y2 = 1:4;y3 = 1: This
corresponds to Case 7 listed in Appendix B. We then have:
Individual 1 : 0 Â1 t2 Â1 t1 Â1 1 (12)
Individual 2 : 1 Â2 t1 Â2 t2 Â2 0 (13)
Individual 3 : t2 Â3 1 Â3 t1 Â3 0: (14)
It can be checked that t2 = 0:74 is now a Condorcet winner, i.e., beats
any other alternative in a pairwise contest.
Note that over the region t1 · t < t2, both 1 and 3’s utility is increasing,
while 2’s utility is decreasing. The explanation is that p and s are low enough
that the expected tax payment for 1 is lower than the per capita grant, hence,
in this region, he beneﬁts from redistribution. So does 3 whose income is
low enough for him to beneﬁt from the combined certain tax payment of 2
and uncertain tax payment of 1. Voter 2, however, has income which is high
enough that he redistributes both towards 3 who has low income and towards
1 who does not pay taxes.
5Note that the ﬁxed ﬁne exceeds the income of taxpayers 2 and 3, but in equilibrium
only individual 1 evades.
9Locally, the tax system redistributes from the middle class (who pay
taxes) to the poor (who also pay taxes but have lower incomes) and to the
rich (who have high income but do not pay taxes). Stigler (1970) formulated
“Director’s law” of income redistribution: the hypothesis that redistribution
would go from the poor and rich to the middle class.6 The result we pre-
sented here is also of the “ends against the middle” type (Epple and Romano,
1996b), but Director’s law is stood on its head, because redistribution goes
from, not to the middle class.
5 Risk Averse Individuals
I now brieﬂy discuss how relaxing the simplifying assumption of risk neu-
trality aﬀects the basic results. Let individuals have utility functions u(c,
u0 > 0 > u00, which implies risk aversion. Expected utility is of the form
Eu = pu((1¡t)y¡(1¡a+at)se¡±F +g)+(1¡p)u((1¡t)y+te+g); (15)
where a 2 [0;1]. This encompasses the case originally analyzed by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972), where the ﬁne is proportional to income evaded (a = 0),
and the case considered by Yitzhaki (1973), where ﬁnes are proportional to
evaded tax (a = 1). ± is a dummy variable equal to one if the taxpayer evades
and zero otherwise. Let b = 1 ¡ a + at. Deﬁne u0 := u((1 ¡ t)y + g) and
∆ := Eu ¡ u0.
The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution to (15) is
Á := ¡pbsu
0
d + (1 ¡ p)tu
0
n = 0: (16)








Provided ∆ > 0, e = 0 if Á < 0 and e = y if Á > 0.
With F > 0, risk aversion implies that ∆ < 0 if t = 0. Hence, there is
a tax rate ti where individual yi is just indiﬀerent between evading or not
evading. Formally, ti = minˆ ti, where ˆ ti solves ∆ = 0.
6This property appears in models of public provision of private goods, where redistri-
bution may go from the poor and rich to the middle class (Epple and Romano, 1996b).
However, Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) present an example of education subsidies where
redistribution is from the poor to the middle class and rich.
10From the discussion in the previous sections, we know that with risk
neutrality, ti is decreasing in income. For the general case, this will hold in
certain circumstances, e.g., if the degree of risk aversion is suﬃciently low
and individuals evade a large fraction of their income. This possibility will
be used below to examine voting equilibria.
In particular, in the absence of single peakedness it is convenient to check
the single crossing property (Gans and Smart, 1996). Deﬁne an individual’s
indiﬀerence curve in g;t space as those combinations of tax rate and trans-











y if t < ti
y ¡
(1¡a)s
s(1¡a(1¡t))+te if t ¸ ti
; (17)
use having been made of (16). Note that (17) holds for an interior optimum.
In general, the slope of the indiﬀerence curve then depends on whether
or not the individual evades. The case analysed so far corresponds to a = 1,
which was the form assumed by Yitzhaki (1973). Examining (17), we ﬁnd
that in this case the slope of the indiﬀerence curve is y if evasion is at
an interior optimum. Since the single crossing property holds in this case,
it is immediately clear that the median income earner is decisive (Gans and
Smart, 1996). Further, richer individuals prefer lower taxes, so the properties
are essentially those of the RRMR model. See Figure 2.
However, the possibility of corner solutions makes the analysis more dif-
ﬁcult. In particular, with a = 1, we get ¾ = y for e < y. For individuals
who would like to evade more than their entire income, the slope is less than
y. Single crossing may not hold in this case, since the indiﬀerence curve of
a rich individual who evades his entire income may be ﬂatter than that of a
poor individual who evades less than the entire income.7
a = 0 corresponds to the original version used by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972). The slope of the indiﬀerence curve with evasion then simpliﬁes to
y¡ s
s+te. An equilibrium could be shown to exist if the slope were increasing
in y in this range and if the tax rate at which an individual starts evading
were the same for everyone. The slope, however, may be decreasing in income
if richer individuals evade a larger fraction of their income, which is the case
7This may seem like a theoretical possibility. But occasionally taxpayers do not declare
any income at all. A notable case is that of former German tennis star Steﬃ Graf who






Figure 2: Single crossing
if relative risk aversion is decreasing in income. Second, for F > 0, if ti is
decreasing in y, single crossing cannot be ensured (see Figure 3). Here single
crossing is assumed to hold in the regions where either both taxpayers pay
taxes or both evade. y1 > y2 implies that y1’s indiﬀerence curve is steeper.
However, t1 < t2 implies that indiﬀerence curves may cross twice as shown.
This implies that an equilibrium need not exist. Further, it is also possible
that a richer individual prefers a higher tax rate than a poorer one, at the
margin.
We summarize the results as follows.
Proposition 2 Let F > 0 and let individuals be risk averse. If a < 1 or
a = 1 and e = y, single crossing does not hold. If a = 1 and e < y, the median
income earner is decisive and richer individuals prefer less redistribution.
Again, there are many possible outcomes. Instead of a complete charac-






Figure 3: No single crossing
also diﬀers from those described above.
Example Let utility be given by u = ln(c ¡ c0), where c0 > 0. This func-
tion displays decreasing absolute and relative risk aversion. Let a = 0:5, and
y1 = 10;y2 = 12;y3 = 15. The other parameters are: s = 0:2;p = 0:015;F =
2;c0 = 2. The three voters’ preferences are shown in Figure 4. Individual 1’s
utility is ﬁrst falling, then concave with a maximum at ˆ t1 = 0:6. Individual
2’s utility is ﬁrst concave with a local maximum at ˜ t2 = 0:004, then concave
with a global maximum at ˆ t2 = 0:55, and lastly increasing. Individual 3’s
utility is concave with a local maximum at 0:0041, then increasing with a
global maximum at 1. The equilibrium tax rate is ˆ t2. While voters 1 and 2
evade their entire income, voter 3 evades only 72 percent.
Note that in this example, redistribution is from poor to rich rather than
from the middle class to the rich and poor: the richest individual pays taxes
13(inclusive of expected ﬁnes) of 1.26 percent of her income, the middle income
voter 1.31 and the poorest voter 16.5 percent. For a similar example in the
case of education policy, see Fernandez and Rogerson (1995). There, the rich
and middle class vote for education subsidies, which are ﬁnanced also by the
poor who do not beneﬁt from them since their income is too low to purchase
education even with the subsidies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analysed how the possibility of tax evasion aﬀects
voting on redistribution. The model has shown that the implications of
tax evasion are not trivial. Equilibria do not need to exist under standard
assumptions on preferences. When they do exist, they may have properties
which diﬀer from conventional voting models. In particular, redistribution
may not go from rich to poor but instead from the middle class to the rich
and poor.
The model was simplistic in some of its assumptions, for instance, risk
neutrality, linear tax and penalty system. We brieﬂy discussed how risk
aversion aﬀects the analysis. Introducing more complex tax and enforcement
policies would make the analysis more complicated, but there would be a
range where the basic results continue to hold. Another interesting extension
might be to allow individuals to choose work in the black economy. Declared
income then depends on the decision of how much to work in the legal and
illegal sectors. Assuming that there are ﬁxed costs of taking up work in the
black economy, one would ﬁnd similar conclusions to those discussed here,
although the nature of the work-leisure tradeoﬀ makes the problem more
complicated (see, e.g., Cowell, 1990 for a discussion.)
The model also has some other implications. For instance, empirical
estimates of tax evasion should treat tax rates as endogenous. Second, the
interaction of tax and audit rates with evasion is also more complicated when
voting is taken into account (Borck, 2002). Suppose the tax authority sets
audit rates and voters choose the tax rate. Then increased auditing may
cause voters to vote for higher tax rates, which in turn may lead to more
evasion.
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Appendix
A Individual Preferences
With four alternatives, each individual has 4! = 24 possible preference proﬁles (see
Table 2). This implies a total of 243 = 13824 possible combinations of the three
individuals preferences. Eliminating those which cannot occur, however, narrows
down the set of potential outcomes.
We ﬁrst insert the diﬀerent tax rates into the individuals’ utility functions,
and denote the resulting utility levels ui0;:::;ui3, where i stands for individual i
and 0;:::;3 for tax rates from 0 to 1 in ascending order. All computations assume
that p =
y3
F+(1+s)y3 so individual 3 never evades at any tax rate t < 1. The
corresponding utility levels are shown in Table 1.
From these utility levels, we can ﬁnd critical income levels, which will be la-
belled y
jk
i , such that voter i prefers alternative j to k if and only if y > y
jk
i :




u10 > u12 , y1 > y02
1 :=
F(y3 ¡ y2) + (1 + s)y3(y2 + y3)
2(1 + s)y3




u11 > u12 , y1 > y12
1 :=
(y2 + y3)(F + (1 + s)y3)
2(1 + s)y3
u11 > u13 , y1 > y13
1 :=
F + (1 + s)y3
1 + s
u12 > u13 , y1 > y23
1 :=
F + (1 + s)(y2 + y3)
2(1 + s)
:




u20 > u22 , y2 > y02
2 :=
y3(F + (1 + s)(y1 + y3))
F + 2(1 + s)y3




u21 > u22 , y2 > y12
2 :=
y3(F + (1 + s)(y1 + y3))
2(F + (1 + s)y3)
u21 > u23 , F > (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3)
u22 > u23 , y2 > y23
2 :=
F + (1 + s)(y1 + y3)
2(1 + s)
:








(p3(1 + s)(y1 ¡ y2) + 2y2)








(p3(1 + s)y1 + y2)
u31 > u33 , y3 > y13
3 :=
(1 + s)y1 ¡ F
1 + s)
u32 > u33 , y3 > y23
3 :=
(1 + s)(y1 + y2) ¡ 2F
2(1 + s)
:
Individual 1 We can rank the critical income levels y02
1 < y03
1 = 1
2(y2 + y3) <
y23
1 < y12
1 , and y13
1 < y12
1 . (1) Since y1 > ¯ y, we know that 0 Â1 t1, which excludes
7 ¡ 12;15;16;18;21;22;24. (2) y1 > y03
1 > y02
1 implies 0 Â1 1 and 0 Â1 t2. This
excludes 13 ¡ 24. (3) y12
1 > y23
1 implies t1 Â1 t2 ) t2 Â1 1. This excludes 2 and
5. This leaves 1, 3, 4, and 6 as possible preferences. 1 holds if y1 > y12
1 , 3 if
y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 and y1 > y13
1 , 4 if y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 and y1 < y13
1 , and 6 if y1 < y23
1
and y1 < y13
1 .






y2 < ¯ y implies y2 < y03
2 , which implies 1 Â2 0, and 1 Â2 t2 as well as t1 Â2 0. This
excludes 1¡10;13¡18;19;20, and 23. This leaves 11;12;21;22, and 24. 11 obtains
if y2 > y02
2 and F > (1+s)(y1 ¡y3), 12 if y12
2 < y2 < y02
2 and F > (1+s)(y1 ¡y3),
24 obtains if y2 < y12
2 and F < (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3), 22 if y12
2 < y2 < y02
2 and
F < (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3), and 21 if y02
2 < y2 and F < (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3).
16Individual 3 For individual 3, we obtain y23
3 < y12
3 < y02





2(y1 + y2) < y302, and y13
3 < y12
3 . (1) From y3 < y2 < ¯ y, we have t1 Â3 0,
t2 Â3 0, and 1 Â3 0. This eliminates 1 ¡ 9;11;13 ¡ 15;17;19 ¡ 21 and 23. (2)
y23
3 < y12
3 implies 1 Â3 t2 ) t2 Â3 t1; and y23
3 < y13
3 implies 1 Â3 t2 ) 1 Â3 t1.
This eliminates 12 and 22. This leaves proﬁles 10;16;18, and 24. 10 obtains if
y3 > y12
3 , 16 if y23
3 < y3 < y12
3 ;y3 > y13
3 , 18 if y23
3 < y3 < y13
3 , and ﬁnally, 24 if
y3 < y23
3 .
B Aggregation of Preferences
From the individual preferences, we can infer some relationships among the indi-
viduals’ preferences.
(1) y1 · y23
1 implies y2 < y12
2 iﬀ y2 < (3y3(F +(1+s)y3)=(4F +3(1+s)y3) < y3,
so 1 Â1 t2 ) t1 Â2 t2.
(2) y1 > y12
1 implies y3 > y12
3 iﬀ y3 > y2, so t1 Â1 t2 ) t2 Â3 t1.
(3) Since y1 < ¯ y > y2 > y3, we have t1 Â1 1 iﬀ y1 > y3 + F=(1 + s), which
implies 1 Â2 t1 and 1 Â3 t1.





4(y2 + 3y3), where the last
inequality follows from substituting y1 = y12
1 into y12
2 , since this expression is
increasing in y1. Solving y2 < 1
4(y2 + 3y3) gives y2 < y3, a contradiction. Hence,
y1 < y12
1 implies y2 > y12
2 .
(5) y1 < y13
1 implies y12
2 < y3. Therefore, y1 < y13
1 implies y2 > y12
2 .
(6) y1 < y13
1 implies y3 > y13
3 and u21 < u23.
All remaining possibilities and the resulting outcomes are shown in Table 3.
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Figure 4: Voter preferences in Example 5
19Table 1: Voter utility at diﬀerent tax rates



























Table 2: Possible Individual Preference Proﬁles
1. 0 Â t1 Â t2 Â 1
2. 0 Â t1 Â 1 Â t2
3. 0 Â t2 Â t1 Â 1
4. 0 Â t2 Â 1 Â t1
5. 0 Â 1 Â t1 Â t2
6. 0 Â 1 Â t2 Â t1
7. t1 Â 0 Â t2 Â 1
8. t1 Â 0 Â 1 Â t2
9. t1 Â t2 Â 0 Â 1
10. t1 Â t2 Â 1 Â 0
11. t1 Â 1 Â 0 Â t2
12. t1 Â 1 Â t2 Â 0
13. t2 Â 0 Â t1 Â 1
14. t2 Â 0 Â 1 Â t1
15. t2 Â t1 Â 0 Â 1
16. t2 Â t1 Â 1 Â 0
17. t2 Â 1 Â 0 Â t1
18. t2 Â 1 Â t1 Â 0
19. 1 Â 0 Â t1 Â t2
20. 1 Â 0 Â t2 Â t1
21. 1 Â t1 Â 0 Â t2
22. 1 Â t1 Â t2 Â 0
23. 1 Â t2 Â 0 Â t1
24. 1 Â t2 Â t1 Â 0
20Table 3: Voting outcomes
Parameter restrictions Individual 1 Individual 2 Individual 3 Equilibrium
A. y2 > y02
2 ;F < (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3)
Case 1. y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 ;y23
3 < y3 < y12
3 0 Â t2 Â t1 Â 1 1 Â t1 Â 0 Â t2 t2 Â 1 Â t1 Â 0 Cycle
Case 2. y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 ;y3 < y23
3 0 Â t2 Â t1 Â 1 1 Â t1 Â 0 Â t2 1 Â t2 Â t1 Â 0 1
B. y2 > y02
2 ;F > (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3)
Case 3. y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 ;y3 > y12
3 0 Â t2 Â 1 Â t1 t1 Â 1 Â 0 Â t2 t1 Â t2 Â 1 Â 0 t1
Case 4. y1 < y23
1 ;y3 > y12
3 0 Â 1 Â t2 Â t1 t1 Â 1 Â 0 Â t2 t1 Â t2 Â 1 Â 0 t1
C. y12
2 < y2 < y02
2 ;F < (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3)
Case 5. y1 > y12
1 ;y23
3 < y3 < y12
3 0 Â t1 Â t2 Â 1 1 Â t1 Â t2 Â 0 t2 Â 1 Â t1 Â 0 Cycle
Case 6. y1 > y12
1 ;y3 < y23
3 0 Â t1 Â t2 Â 1 1 Â t1 Â t2 Â 0 1 Â t2 Â t1 Â 0 1
Case 7. y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 ;y23
3 < y3 < y12
3 0 Â t2 Â t1 Â 1 1 Â t1 Â t2 Â 0 t2 Â 1 Â t1 Â 0 t2
Case 8. y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 ;y3 < y23
3 0 Â t2 Â t1 Â 1 1 Â t1 Â t2 Â 0 1 Â t2 Â t1 Â 0 1
D. y12
2 < y2 < y02
2 ;F > (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3)
Case 9. y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 ;y3 > y12
3 0 Â t2 Â 1 Â t1 t1 Â 1 Â t2 Â 0 t1 Â t2 Â 1 Â 0 t1
Case 10. y23
1 < y1 < y12
1 ;y23
3 < y3 < y12
3 0 Â t2 Â 1 Â t1 t1 Â 1 Â t2 Â 0 t2 Â t1 Â 1 Â 0 t2
Case 11. y1 < y23
1 ;y3 > y12
3 0 Â 1 Â t2 Â t1 t1 Â 1 Â t2 Â 0 t1 Â t2 Â 1 Â 0 t1
Case 12. y1 < y23
1 ;y23
3 < y3 < y12
3 0 Â 1 Â t2 Â t1 t1 Â 1 Â t2 Â 0 t2 Â t1 Â 1 Â 0 Cycle
E. y2 < y12
2 ;F < (1 + s)(y1 ¡ y3)
Case 13. y1 > y12
1 ;y23
3 < y3 < y12
3 0 Â t1 Â t2 Â 1 1 Â t2 Â t1 Â 0 t2 Â t1 Â 1 Â 0 t2
Case 14. y1 > y12
1 ;y3 < y23
3 0 Â t1 Â t2 Â 1 1 Â t2 Â t1 Â 0 1 Â t2 Â t1 Â 0 1
21